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Abstract
We examine the nature of the relationship between government size
and economic growth and identify the optimal level of government size
using a large dataset through a novel and very general non-linear panel
Generalized Method of Moments approach. We show that this rela-
tionship is statistically signicant above and below the optimal level,
even after splitting our sample to developed and developing countries.
Finally, we nd an asymmetric impact of government size on economic
growth in both developed and developing countries around the esti-
mated threshold.
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1 Introduction
The impact of government size on economic growth has been the focal point of
academic research for many years (i.e. Barro (1990), Karras (1997), Gunalp
and Dincer (2010) among others). Over the past decade, and especially
following the recent European sovereign debt crisis, the level of government
spending has been at the centre of many political debates. For instance, one
of the primary targets of the Euro Plus Pact in 2011 is the sustainability of
public nances within the European Union.
An oversized government sector may have negative spillover e¤ects to
the economy due to nancing of government spending via increasing taxes,
borrowing and/or printing money. On the contrary, if government spending is
very small, or even zero, the economic growth is very limited due to di¢ culties
in the provision of public goods. Therefore, the optimal level of government
spending which maximizes growth is an issue of paramount importance.
The empirical literature is yet inconclusive. Several papers, using linear
approaches, nd that government spending and growth are negatively related
(e.g. Dar and AmirKhalkhali (2002) and Guseh (2007)), whereas other stud-
ies nd a positive relationship (e.g. Bose et al. (2007) and Romero-Ávila
and Strauch (2008)).
The majority of existing literature supports an inverted "U-shaped" curve
relationship between government spending and economic growth, also known
as the BARS curve after Barro (1990), Armey (1995), Rahn and Fox (1996)
and Scully (1995). In other words, the increase of government spending is
benecial up to a certain threshold but beyond that level the impact on
growth is negative. Studies that empirically test the BARS curve include:
Karras (1997), Chen and Lee (2005), Chiou-Wei et al. (2010), Gunalp and
Dincer (2010) and Altunc and Ayd¬n (2013).1
In order to establish the optimal level of government spending, a rich
panel of countries should be employed. Most important, there is a prevailing
issue of endogeneity, which has not been addressed in the literature, since
higher growth over a time period may incite greater government spending
through the channel of higher returns from taxation.
In this paper we uncover the non-linear relationship between government
size and economic growth and identify the optimal government expenditure
through the novel non-linear panel GMM approach of Seo and Shin (2014)
which allows for a threshold e¤ect with endogenous regressors and threshold
1We would like to mention here that throughout the paper we follow the related liter-
ature and we dene as government spending and size the general government nal con-
sumption expenditure which does not include government investment.
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variables. Using a large dataset of 129 countries2, we establish a robust and
statistically signicant non-linear relationship between government spend-
ing and economic growth. Furthermore, we show that this impact remains
valid even if we split the sample to developed and developing countries, with
asymmetric e¤ects on the two groups.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 analyses the results and Section 4 presents the conclusions.
2 Model
Following the endogenous growth literature (i.e. Barro (1990) and Karras
(1997)) we use as dependent variable the growth rate of GDP per capita
and as explanatory variables the following: i) the general government nal
consumption expenditure as a share of output; ii) the ination rate as the
percentage change of CPI; iii) the gross capital formation to capture the share
of investment to output; iv) openness to trade; and v) population growth.
We use data on 129 countries from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
for the period 1980-2009 using non-overlapping 5-year periods and averaging
the data per variable and country within that period. We then perform a
dynamic panel threshold estimation to estimate the optimal level of govern-
ment spending for the average country in our sample. The model we use
is:
GROWTHi;t = ai + GROWTHi;t 1 + 1GOVi;tI(GOVi;t  )
+2GOVi;tI(GOVi;t > ) + Xi;t + t + "i;t
(1)
where ai is the individual e¤ect for each country which captures individual
heterogeneity, t is the common time e¤ect which captures comovement of
the series due to external shocks and "it is the remainder error term. GOV is
the government nal consumption expenditure as a share of GDP and serves
as the threshold variable where the threshold is given by the parameter .
I() is the indicator function which takes the value 1 when the condition in
the parenthesis is satised and 0 otherwise. Vector Xi;t contains ination,
capital formation, openness to trade and population growth variables.
The model commonly used in the literature (e.g. Islam (1995), Levine et
al. (2000)) is the following: yi;t = yi;t 1+xi;t+ai+"i;t, or, augmented with
threshold terms: yi;t = yi;t 1 + 1zi;tI(qi;t  ) + 2zi;tI(qi;t > ) + xi;t +
ai + "i;t where y = ln (GDP=capita). We noticed that ln (GDP=capita) is
highly persistent so we tested all variables for nonstationarity using panel
2We use all the available countries in the World Bank dataset with observations for all
the variables we consider for the period under consideration.
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unit root tests for small time dimension (Harris and Tzavalis (1999)). We
nd that ln (GDP=capita) is the only nonstationary variable and therefore it
enters our model in rst di¤erences, i.e. yi;t = GROWTHi;t in model (1).
Rewriting the linear literature model as: yi;t = (   1)yi;t 1 + xi;t +
1zi;tI(qi;t  ) + 2zi;tI(qi;t > ) + ai + "i;t we can compare it with our
model that has yi;t 1 instead of yi;t 1 as the explanatory variable due to
nonstationarity: yi;t = yi;t 1 + 1zi;tI(qi;t  ) + 2zi;tI(qi;t > ) +
xi;t + ci + i;t: Thus, the interpretation of  and  is the same in both
models, but the interpretation of  changes.3 We should also note that the
two models have di¤erent individual e¤ects and error terms but this does not
lead to inconsistent estimators because the correct instruments are used in
each case.4
We estimate model (1) using the novel GMM method of Seo and Shin
(2014) which allows for endogenous regressors and threshold variables and
uses Arellano and Bond (1991) type instruments. The method proceeds in
two steps: i) for a selected parameter value of ; estimates of  = (; 1; 2; )
are obtained by Arellano-Bond GMM; ii) step (i) is repeated for 0s belonging
in a strict subset of the support of GOV; resulting in a di¤erent ^GMM for
each selected : The  which minimizes the GMM-type objective function
and its corresponding ^GMM are the optimal estimated parameters.
Compared with other methods in the threshold literature, namely the
static method of Hansen (1999) (used by Christie (2014)) and the GMM
method of Kremer et al. (2013), the applied one here has the advantage
that it allows for endogenous regressors and endogenous threshold variables.
This is empirically relevant because higher growth over a period of time may
incite greater government spending through the channel of higher returns
from taxation. We estimate the model using ve year averaged data and
time dummies to abstract from business cycle inuences (see Levine et al.
(2000)).5
3The parameter  captures the speed of convergence and it is not the focus of our
paper. The focus of our paper is the parameters  and  that are not a¤ected by this
transformation.
4For the literature model the levels and di¤erences of yi;t 1 are used as instruments,
while for our model the levels and di¤erences of yi;t 1 form the instruments.
5In all cases the full set of collapsed instruments was used to improve the small sample
properties, see e.g. Roodman (2009). The Windmeijer small sample correction was not
implemented as it is unclear if it extends to non-linear GMM as in this case. Time
dummies are used only in the full sample regression because in the subsamples examined
the number of countries drops considerably and extra variables lead to disproportionate
number of instruments. Finally, as Table 1 indicates below, the parameter  is very far
from the value of 1 and so there is no weak instrumentation problem. The results with
the System GMM estimator are qualitatively similar and thus are not reported here but
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3 Results
Table 1 presents the results from the estimation of model (1). The rst
column shows the results for the full sample, whereas columns two and three
present the results for developing and developed countries respectively.6
Regarding the full sample, we nd that the optimal threshold level of
government size is 18.04%. This falls within the range reported in the related
literature. For example, Karras (1997), in a sample of 20 European countries,
nds that the optimal level of government spending is equal to 16%, whereas
Gunalp and Dincer (2010), in a sample of 20 transition countries, reports a
threshold of 17.3%. In di¤erent studies on individual countries, Chen and
Lee (2005), Chiou-Wei et al. (2010) and Altunc and Ayd¬n (2013) report a
threshold estimation within the range of 11-25%.7
Besides the estimation of the optimal level of government spending we
determine its non-linear impact on economic growth when it is above and
below that level. In other words, we assess empirically the validity of BARS
curve. We nd strong evidence of the existence of an inverted "U-shaped"
relationship between government size and economic growth. We are the
rst to uncover a statistically signicant relationship between government
spending and economic growth for both above and below the optimal level
of government spending.8
In particular, under the full sample, when the government size of the av-
erage country is below the threshold, a 1% increase in government spending,
as a share of GDP, will enhance economic growth by 0.99%. However, if the
average country is above the threshold then a 1% increase in government
size will decrease growth by 0.65%. Therefore, the impact of government
spending on growth is larger quantitatively when it is below the estimated
threshold.
The above result remains valid even if we split our sample to developed
and developing countries with estimated thresholds equal to 17.96% and
are available upon request.
6The developed countries are those listed as high income countries and the rest of the
countries are assumed to be developing, following the classication of the World Bank.
7Note that the relevant estimated threshold of government size refers to the level of
general government nal consumption expenditure which does not include government
investment. This approach is common in the related literature due to data availability
issues.
8We have also estimated our main regression with the inclusion of initial GDP as a
robustness check and the results do not change signicantly. The results are available
upon request. However, we should note here that the use of initial GDP in our dynamic
panel model is redundant because convergence is captured by the model dynamics, see.
e.g. Islam (1995).
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19.12% respectively.9 Gray et al. (2007) has shown that larger governments
tend to allocate a bigger share of their spending on unproductive sources
compared to smaller countries. As a result, taking into account that govern-
ment spending is mostly nanced via taxation, a lower threshold estimation
should be optimal for the developed countries.
In our sample the average government spending for the developing coun-
tries is 14.83%, whereas for the developed countries it is 17.88%. This indi-
cates that the majority of the developing countries are still on the upward
slopping part of the BARS curve and they can benet from an increase in
their government spending. On the other hand, the government size of the
average developed country is very close to their optimal level.
Furthermore, we nd that for the developing countries the negative e¤ect
of a larger than optimal government size is more signicant quantitatively
than the positive e¤ect from a government size below optimal. In addition,
developed countries have stronger positive e¤ects when government size in-
creases when it is below optimal, compared to the negative e¤ects when it is
above the estimated threshold. As a result, there is an asymmetric impact of
government size on economic growth in developed and developing countries
around the estimated threshold. This result may be stemmed from the fact
that the developed countries have better government institutions that are
able to exploit all the benets from the positive e¤ects of higher government
expenditure and mitigate its negative e¤ects.10
9We have also performed the same analysis for OECD countries and we found very
similar results with those for developed countries.
10However, note that the better government institutions do not lead to higher threshold
e¤ects possibly due to the argument of Gray et al. (2007) mentioned earlier. We would
like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possible interpretation of the result.
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Table 1: Results of non-linear dynamic threshold estimations
Sample Full Developing Developed
Threshold 18.0387 19.1246 17.9647
(28.2371)*** (50.66)*** (55.3826)***
Government size
^1 0.9948 0.272 1.048
(4.0155)*** (2.0211)** (4.7456)***
^2 -0.6476 -0.715 -0.5975
(-3.6051)*** (-4.0335)*** (-5.2383)***
Covariates
Lagged Growth 0.1373 -0.0036 0.0661
(1.8472)* (-0.0321) (1.498)
Capital Formation 0.1604 0.0211 0.2536
(2.5523)** (0.1757) (6.4925)***
Ination 0.0007 0.0002 0.0725
(0.561) (0.1343) (0.9555)
Openness 0.0269 0.1035 0.0128
(0.8882) (4.688)*** (0.7566)
Population 0.1891 0.6356 -0.4027
(0.2187) (0.854) (-0.644)
Quarter e¤ects Yes No No
Observations 774 516 258
N 129 86 43
Note: t-statistics in the parentheses. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
Regarding the remaining variables we nd that capital formation is pos-
itive and statistically signicant for the full sample and the developed coun-
tries. The openness to trade is statistically signicant only for the developing
countries. Lagged growth is weakly signicant for the full sample with a small
positive coe¢ cient. Finally, the coe¢ cient of ination is close to zero and
insignicant; and population growth doesnt have any signicant e¤ect on
growth either, as in the related literature.11
11Note that the insignicance of some of the growth determinants maybe due to possible
non-linear e¤ects on growth instead of the linear assumed in our analysis. When allowing
for non-linear e¤ects in both government and ination, with government spending still
being the threshold variable, we nd evidence of non-linearities, as in Kremer et al. (2013).
The results are available upon request. A full analysis on the subject is left for future
research.
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4 Conclusions
We assessed the non-linear relationship between government size and eco-
nomic growth under a large panel dataset using a dynamic panel threshold
model which allows for non-linear threshold e¤ect with endogenous regressors
and threshold variables.
The empirical results veried the theoretical BARS curve. We found
that the optimal level of government size that maximises economic growth is
18.04% for the full sample; 19.12% for developing and 17.96% for developed
countries.
We were able to show that the inverted "U-shaped" non-linear relation-
ship between government spending and economic growth is statistically sig-
nicant around the optimal level, the upward and downward slopping part of
the curve. We concluded that the results remained valid and robust under a
split of our sample to developed and developing countries. Finally, we found
that the e¤ect of government spending on economic growth is asymmetric to
developed and developing countries when it is above and below the optimal
level.
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